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The Context of Development Studies and the
Necessity of Theory
Development studies is centrally concerned with
change in all aspects of societies, arguably changes in
the whole world economy. Thus, insofar as conven-
tional knowledge is concerned with equilibrium and
divides experience into firmly delineated disciplines,
there is an immediate problem of commensurability
between the language of understanding and that of
explanation. It is possible for an acute observer to
understand a situation using the language of those
directly affected; to explain it appears to require
experiments by scientists using a technical language
of theory. This problem was seen initially as a failure
of a particular discipline. For instance, Randall Baker
wrote in the early 1970s on geography in develop-
ment studies
there has been a tendency in the past (which this
article is perpetuating!) for geographers to speak to
the converted by researching and publishing within
the almost closed system of geography. By the
incorporation of geography into the School of
Development Studies, the subject will have tn
interact with other disciplines, and its contribution
will be judged in the market place alongside other
social sciences. [Baker 1973: 279]; emphasis
addedthe irony of the emphasised phrase will
become apparent.
But, by the mid-1970s, everyone had taken a glance
at each others' disciplines and decided they all had
problems. For example, Tony Barnett and Deryke
Belshaw reported in 1975 on teaching together about
rural development as a sociologist and an economist
respectively:
The paradigms of these disciplines (mainstream
economics and sociology) are so different, however,
that an integrated macro-theory does not seem pos-
sible on this basis. It may be useful in friture to
introduce more detailed case studies earlier in the
This article is the result of research work carried out by the
authors whilst teaching principles of economics in the School of
Development Studies. Whilst Athole Mackintosh would not
have agreed with all the points here, we feel it owes much to the
spirit of critical enquiry he himself brought to bear on the subject.
The argument has been carefully developed as an undergraduate
textbook entitled The Political Economy of Economics, to be
published by Longmans in 1981.
course specifically to demonstrate the limitations
of each single discipline.
[Barnett and Belshaw 1975: 141 our parenthesis.
The understandable response to this finding has been
a tendency to abandon the disciplines altogether and
move towards case studies as a teaching device. This
response encouraged a number of positive changes in
the practice of teaching development studies. These
included increased student participation as lecturers
were forced to admit the inadequacy of theory, and
the use or more localand hence more access-
iblematerial, thus diminishing the 'Third World'
exclusiveness of development studies. Both student
participation in the education process and the use of
local material are important steps forward in our
view, and we feel these advantages can be generally
maintained without abandoning rigorous theory and
retreating into ex post rationalisations of unrepeat-
able incidents. Economics has suffered much for
early arrogance in claiming priority in the field of
development studies. The path through dualism,
two-gap models, take-off, unbalanced growth,
export-led growth, trickle-down and dependence, is
one along which economics has stumbled proclaim-
ing constantly that this time the calculations were
correct. Economists are now notorious as people who
not only have apparently insurmountable differences
but also are capable of all being wrong simultane-
ously. In such a context, it is a brave teacher who says
that principles of economics in a School of Develop-
ment Studies should be about 'principles' of a rigor-
ous discipline. But this is what the authors have been
doing for the last three years and they feel able to
claim that the insights their approach give are impor-
tant to understanding social change in the world
today. At the end of the article are listed a few of the
books and articles we have found useful in the past
(Appendix I).
Confused Unity or Clear Conflict
That economics ha particular problems can be illus-
trated by the treatment of two issues which are of
some interest to all economists concerned with
developmentthe issues of 'growth' and 'inflation'.
The following are some of the areas of ambiguity and
disagreement on these issues: definition of terms (eg
does 'inflation' include wage level changes?); prob-
lems of priority (eg is stopping price rises the most
important government goal?); problems of imputing
causality (cg what is 'the cause' of a price rise?); and
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closely related problems of how to test the theories
(eg if one economist says wage rises cause price rises
and another says that price rises cause wage rises,
how can one adjudicate between the explanations?).
Economists interested directly in underdevelopment
are acutely aware of these problems, as their partici-
pation in planning and aid agencies in underde-
veloped countries apparently has given them a great
deal of influence. But their sensitivity to the problem
has not produced strong guidelines for sorting wheat
from chaff. For example, Michael Todaro writes:
A careful selection of appropriate economic con-
cepts and principles adapted to the realities of these
,uuions is not only desirable but essential to an
adequate understanding of the way in which
economics can contribute to Third World develop-
ment. [Todaro 1977: 621
This apparently unexceptionable statement becomes
inoperable when people have to agree on what are
'reality', and 'development', let alone on whether
'nations' and the 'Third World' are meaningful start-
ing points!
Avoiding the Issue in Standard Textbooks and
Blaming Politicians
In the two introductory textbooks which have domi-
nated the field of economics teaching over the part 15
years, the authors conclude in the following unsatis-
factory way on the two issues referred to earlier,
'inflation' and 'growth':
Certain theories have been put forward. One is that
periods of very high demand and mild inflationary
pressures are beneficial to growth. It is argued that
such periods provide the businessman with both the
incentive to invest and the funds (which can be
withheld out of profits) with which to finance the
investment. Another theory says that periods of
moderate excess capacity, with an absence of
inflationary pressures, are most conducive to
growth. The argument here is that, when there is
some unemployment in the economy, resources for
new investment will be readily available, and that
innovations in terms of new products or cost reduc-
tions in old ones provide the only possible promise
of large profits. As yet we really do not know
enough to choose between them.
[Lipsey 1971: 7051
Is there a tendency for price levels to rise even when
a sizable and undesirable level of unemployment
persists? If there is such a modern tendency, then
policy decision becomes hard, and compromises
may be necessary. 'Price stability is a prerequisite
for growth.' 'Growth is a prerequisite for reasonable
price stability'. 'New mechanisms for an incomes
policy must coordinate free collective bargaining'.
'Some price creep may at times be the necessary
compromise that must be made in the interest of
growth and tolerably high employment'. These are
varying views among which citizens and statesmen
must today choose. [Samuelson 1967: 777]
So the student reading 15 hundred pages of these two
texts finds that on two of the crucial issues of the day,
all the analysis has produced is statements which are
either ambiguous or non-commital. But all around
the student, people, including those who call them-
selves economists, are firmly taking positions which
show both directness and commitment. At the end of
a year of studying ecOnomics, students cannot be
blamed for thinking that they have learnt nothing
about the rough and tumble of the world outside.
Also some of the more astute may well be suspicious
that a statement like 'the division between macro-
and micro-economics is not a matter of right and
wrong but rather a matter of convenience' [Lipsey
1971: 435] is not even particularly rigorous. Thus,
failing from the points of view of application and
logic, economics can easily seem irrelevant and arbit-
rary, and from the student's point of view, boring and
confusing.
Of course, nobody expects to learn a difficult subject
in a year, but unless the student is treated with respect
at the start then there is a strong disincentive to
discontinue the study of the subject or not treat it
seriously. Students know that economists disagree,
that incoming governments bring in their 'own'
economic advisers and that in most universities and
colleges there are obvious disagreements between
facultynot just on detail but on fundamental prin-
ciples. And yet the texts they are faced with blandly
assure them that in many cases of disagreement,
'further research could lead to a consensus of opin-
ion' [Lipsey 1971: 722] and that
the reader who has persisted this far now has a
general knowledge of the economic analysis that is
used all over the worldin the United States, Bri-
tain, Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, and
Asia. The tools of economic analysis, developed
and tested over more than a century, are turning out
to have an applicability beyond the range of
economics narrowly defined. In the hands of scho-
lars like Michigan's Kenneth Boulding, they are
applied to the pressing problem of conflict resolu-
tion and struggle; in countless departments ofopera-
dons research, and in the Pentagon military estab-
lishment itself they are being used to increase the
efficiency of executive decision making. Like a gun,
which can be used to defend a home or bully a
harmless stranger, these tools have an efficiency
whose final contribution to welfare must depend on
how they are used and by whom. They also have a
certain austere aesthetic grace.
[Samuelson 1967:
In contrast, our approach takes seriously both the
disagreements among economists and the students'
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experience of such discord. There are no efforts to
paper over cracks by concealing conflict. Neither do
we wish to set up any case as simply a target to be
knocked down. Fights over policy are shown to have
roots in deep conflicts over the essential nature of
human activity. These conflicts not only divide
economists, but run right through contemporary
societies. The sphere of knowledge we call economics
has been peculiarly, but not uniquely, split. Econo-
mics is especially interesting in development studies
because its central concern is with 'valuation' in its
widest sense. Economists have found it impossible to
stand back from pronouncing on the way to achieve
improved states of society. Some 'economists' claim
only to present 'politicians' with objective evalua-
tions of the likely outcome of policies, but in such
cases we would argue that the 'economist' must adopt
the basic assumptions of the 'politician' about the
valuation of social activity or communication will
break down.
For example, the analysis by several leading
economic forecasters of the 1979 UK budget,
showed to be: increasing unemployment, higher
inflation, lower economic growth and a rise in an
already substantial balance of payments surplus in
the coming year, as compared with the predicted
outcome if the government had done nothing. These
economists now in the wilderness, no longer con-
nected with policy decisions, because their whole
concept of using such indicators to evaluate a state of
society was under challenge from a view (backed by
many other economists) that the state of UK society
must be valued in a very different way. On the new
view whether these economists were wrong in their
calculations was not the argument: what was wrong
were the principles of valuation that gave those par-
ticular calculations any great significance. Econom-
ists, then, may be forced to choose whether to go into
the wilderness with principled politicians of similar
values when power is lost, or stay close to power but
only at cost of changing principles. Multi-principled
people may well exist, but history suggests that the
line between the multi-principled and the confused
and unprincipled may be difficult to discern. In trying
to serve all masters, an economist will fail to achieve
the confidence and respect of any; in serving one, an
economist may fail to achieve any influence or effec-
tiveness in policy making. Keynes, whose own
experiencefrom influence to (well-cushioned) wil-
derness, to influence againgave good reason to
reflect on the relationship between economics and
power, wrote at the end of his major work:
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite
exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually
the slaves of some defunct economist.
[Keynes 1967: 3831
Whilst this thought is comforting to economists out of
influence, more worrying and probably more accu-
rate would be an amended version along the lines:
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Defunct economists are usually slaving to bring
themselves to the attention of practical men.
Why Economics is Important: Valuation as a
Central Concern
All the efforts of economists to pass themselves off as
a profession standing above the political fray, capable
of passing disinterested judgment on the petty dis-
agreements of politicians, have foundered on internal
dissension and not on external criticism. So, in
economics at least, dog does eat dog, but not indis-
criminately. There is some pack loyalty between dogs
of similar breed. Our investigations over the last five
years have identified three pure breeds (described
below) which form a basis for successful in-breeding
and are capable of giving rise to all the cross-breeds
we have seen in the past. Unfortunately, the mon-
grels have always proved to have dysfunctional
characteristicscrosses between bulldogs, grey-
hounds and pekinese are unlikely to be successful! In
our view, the only link between these three groups of
economists is their concern with valuation. Of course,
the generality of this term allows a variety of interpre-
tations, and most of these interpretations have been
emphasised by people calling themselves economists.
The particular perspective that an economist brings
to human activity is a judgement of its worth. This
judgement may be only qualitative (eg that a job is
socially unproductive), or relative (eg this good is
worth more than that) or absolute (eg my fee is $200
a day for that service). Bound up with any judgement
ot worth is a theory of how value comes into exis-
tence, je what is the cause of value. Armed with such
a theory it is possible both to describe what is happen-
ing in society and to prescribe what should be done to
achieve a worthier (or more developed) state of socie-
ty. It is this ability to describe and link that descrip-
tion to prescription that is crucial to the emergence of
a distinct school of thought with the ability to survive.
Description implies a matching with some part of
experience; increasingly this matching has emphas-
ised experiments by economists rather than observa-
tion by people, but appeals to self-evident truths and
common sense are still made in order to justify
theories. If such a description is deficient, then the
theory can be called 'utopian' in that, while it may
suggest a desirable future, it fails to link that future
with observed present, thus losing the support of
those who consider themselves 'realists'.
The step from description to prescription implies the
application of reasonthat is, we can only agree on
action if the links between activity and outcome are
clear. Reason implies an agreed set of rules about the
nature of the links and economists have emphasised
the rules of logic, increasingly in the form of
mathematics, although some have implicitly indi-
cated scepticism about the limiting of economics to
issues which can be formulated mathematically.
Without clear links of reason, then theory runs the
risk of 'inconsistency' and thus losing its appeal to
those who consider themselves 'rationalists'. Lastly,
without prescription a theory can give no guide to
policy and thus is unattractive to those who consider
themselves 'activists', in the sense that they believe in
our power to change the world for the better.
A theory which offends against realists, rationalists
and/or activists is unlikely to thrive in present day
society, whereas one which appeals to all three has a
good chance of survival. All three of our schools of
economic thought do meet these criteria for survival.
Each points to an area of experience as matching its
description, carefully displays the logic of its argu-
ments, and arrives at policy conclusions. But, in the
past, judgements of valuation and worth were not the
prerogative of people called economists but belonged
to other people, often calling themselves bishops and
kings. Theology has always concerned itself with
value and worth, as has the study of the exercise of
justice. For economists to gain predominance
required a change in society which came with the
development of exchange through relatively
anonymous markets. The market gives the experi-
ence of not being governed by representatives of
either gods or kings. The extension of markets into
more and more areas of life was thus a revolutionary,
and in many ways liberating, experience for the mass
of people, and a threat to vested interests. The
expression of this experience in the realm of ideas
was a shift towards justifying the valuation of
activities by reference to markets and prices. But,
since those who have the privilege of time to write
down ideas are often closest to old vested interests,
the intellectual support of the market as an indepen-
dent source of value was slow in developing.
Mercantilists and physiocratic writers in Europe in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries showed con-
fusion over valuation in the market as against previ-
ous moral and political bases of valuation. But in the
thought of Adam Smith in the eighteenth century,
value as revealed in the market place was raised to a
dominant position. Even though valuation in the
market place never completely displaced values in
the pew (ie moral judgements) or on the hustings (ie
judgements based on power), it has raised economists
to prominence. Thus the position of economists as
theorists of valuation has become increasingly strong.
But our research has identified three different
theories of valuation put forward by economists.
(This parallel development of competing theories is
shown in diagramatic form in Appendix II.)
The Subjective Preference Theory of Value
Adam Smith focused attention on the market as the
primary location of valuation but failed to provide an
unambiguous explanation of the origin of such value
even though he generally approved of its results. The
links between acceptance of market valuation and
justification of market valuation have been
developed by a series of writers stretching from
Smith's time to our ownsuch as Jevons, Fisher,
Hayek and Friedman. The common basis of their
thinking we have termed the subjective preference
theory of value. The starting point for this theory is
the individual, endowed with tastes, talents and
rationality, who calculates actions so as, to maximise
personal welfare, or in technical terms, utility. The
individual's tastes define preferences between alter-
native consumption patterns including leisure. The
individual's talents, on the other hand, define an
ability to fulfil these desires, through productive
activity. Thus tastes lead to consumption and talents
lead to production. Where productivity is increased
through a specialist division of labour, then there is
an apparent separation between the individual as
consumer and as producer. The link between these
two spheres is exchange in markets, with relative
rates of exchange being determined by the indi-
vidual's relative utility derived from the consumption
of more goods at the expense of less leisure. These
decisions are coordinated using a special talent,
called entrepreneurship, which combines inputs in
order to maximise the personal utility of such
talented individuals through maximising profit.
Inputs can be grouped as labour services (ie negative
leisure) and capital services (ie postponed consump-
tion), both of which cost utility to the supplier. The
rewards that individuals get can consist of profit, as
the return to the organising talent of the entre-
preneur; wages for other workers; and interest for
those who loan resources to entrepreneurs.
The independence of the individuals within the
economy means that society is seen as the sum of the
individuals that compose it. Society is the product of
individuals, and as such the analysis of social forces is
irrelevant, as is any historical analysis of social
development. Social behaviour consists therefore of
relating to others through exchange because of dif-
ferential tastes or talents. Where there is free ex-
change there is no contradiction between the indi-
vidual interest and the social interest, since no-one
has to enter into an exchange if it is not in their
interest so to do. Thus a voluntary equilibrium situa-
tion can be deduced where individuals pay in utility
terms in supplying productive inputs, and receive
according to the utility they gain from consuming
products. Value is determined in consumption, in the
sense that productive activity is only undertaken if
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consumption is desired. Since the dynamic of the
system is the maximisation of individual utility, the
policy implications that follow are designed to create
an institutional environment which allows maximum
freedom for individual decisions. Thus the role of the
state is to provide the apparatus for the enforcement
of contracts in free markets.
This implies a profound objection to active govern-
ment intervention in the economy, and scepticism
over the significance of aggregate relationships, as in
Friedman [1977] and Brittan [1975]. The values of
the free marketplace reveal themselves as prices to
which each individual is at liberty (a vital word) to
respond independently of the power of others. Of
course, many economists have proclaimed a funda-
mental confidence in the market process as the best
way of ensuring the greatest happiness for all, but
desired to qualify that support on some particular
issues--perhaps health or education. For the pur-
poses of this argument we are not concerned with
treating such qualifications in detail, but try to show
the basis of the unifying fundamental confidence. It is
a rather daunting thought that, whenever an econom-
ist talks uncritically about supply and demand in a
market, behind those apparently uncontroversial
terms lies the assumption of a whole philosophy of
possessive individualism, liberal politics and the basic
tenets of modern civilisation. But it does perhaps
make a little more interesting.
Why did people wait so long to discover this desirable
way of organising social activities? Human experi-
ence up to 1750 appears largely a waste of time if free
markets are the key to wellbeing. The answer for
subjective preference theory lies in the change of
thinking which occurred at about that time in Europe
and North America, which is known as the Enlight-
enment. Intellectual energy was diverted towards
understanding what we might do on earth now, rather
than what we might do to regain a glorious past or
achieve a heaven in the future. By ceasing to ask
'why' some of the time and asking 'how' instead,
enormous changes were quickly made to the physical
world and new possibilities discovered in the rela-
tionship between individuals and society. The prob-
lem with asking 'how' and not 'why' is that knowledge
becomes more tentative, as well as more powerful.
Making statements about how a market works if left
to its own devices assumes that the audience accepts
that those statements are likely to apply in the future
and in different places.
The point that present knowledge is always tentative
is central to the philosophy of Karl Popper, who is
something of a doyen among leading subjective pre-
ference theorists. His position is that, providing a
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theory can be exposed to a test of falsification
through observation, it can stand as explaining how
the observation was generated. This position on the
nature of 'scientific' knowledge is consistent with
subjective preference theory because it renders the
untestable assumptions about individualism unim-
portant compared with predictions about observable
market behaviour. Unfortunately, there is a tempta-
tion to cross the line between saying 'the world acts as
if it were composed of independent individuals' to
'the world is composed of independent individuals'.
But the use of mathematics, and its relationship to
complex statistical experiments, has given subjective
preference theory a firm methodological base, in
addition to its philosophical roots. The theory has a
durable strength which goes beyond fashion and par-
ticular economists; it thus can claim an independent
existence and can be spoken of as an actor in its own
right.
The Cost of Production Theory of Value
But to recognise that valuation in the market is signif-
icant does not necessarily make it desirable. The
optimism about the market system which developed
into subjective preference theory was met almost at
its moment of historical conception by a profound
pessimism which was to give economics the lasting
label of the 'dismal science'. This pessimism
appeared in Smith's writing as a concern with the
psychological impact of routine, monotonous work
on the human mind, but in the hands of David
Ricardo in the early part of the nineteenth century
the pessimism became more profound. Ricardo
started from the proposition that, whilst value
appears in the market, it originates and changes with
the rewards that must be paid for inputs into produc-
tion. Labourers must receive sufficient to live, and
capitalists (ie those who provide resources for
labourers to work up) must receive a return in addi-
tion to their original outlay if production is to expand.
Malthus introduced two assumptions about the
nature of the physical world: first, that the population
of labourers grows if resources are available to feed
it, and, secondly, that the productivity of a given
bundle of labour and resources falls as more and
more land is brought into use.
Under these assumptions, the market process pro-
duces stagnation as a final equilibrium condition,
with the mass of the population living at a level of
bare physiological subsistence facing a group of land-
owners conspicuously consuming all the rest of soci-
ety's resources. It is this central concern with the
production decision, the distribution of output be-
tween the 'contributors' to production, and the ten-
dency to stagnation (usually measured in numbers of
unemployed) if market forces operate alone, that
distinguishes an approach to valuation we have called
'the cost of production theory of value' which is
exemplified by Marshall, Veblen, Keynes and Gal-
braith. In its purest form, the theory starts from the
fact that people combine to undertake production in
an increasingly complex and inflexible fashion. Social
relations are therefore largely determined by the
needs of technology rather than voluntary exchange;
a technology which, like the tastes, talents and pro-
pensities of the subjective preference approach, is
given from outside economics.
This technology changes as people learn more about
the physical world and these changes put new
requirements on people to change their behaviour.
The problems of adjustment may come from a
number of sources. First, decentralised decision-
making may mean that the inter-connections bet-
ween producers break down when general change is
required. Secondly, the ideas and institutions that
people develop to organise themselves for produc-
tion and distribution may lag behind the possibilities
or requirements of the new situation. For instance,
markets which involve considerations about the
future, eg stock and financial marketswhich are so
crucial to decision-makers in industry where a new
technology may take five years or more to come into
full operationare notoriously liable to violent fluc-
tuations or breakdown. Thirdly, even if stagnation is
avoided, this may only be at the price of granting
disproportionate power to a small group of produc-
tion decision-makers whose particular interest may
differ from those of the rest of society. Thus, whilst
cost of production theory accepts that value appears
as market prices, it sees the source of that value in
production adjusted by distributional factors and is
sceptical about prices as the final measure of social
value.
For example, 'silicon chip' technology offers new
opportunities for higher output or higher unemploy-
ment, and also higher profits or higher wages. For
cost of production theory, the precise outcome will
depend on a social response to these opportunities far
wider than those industries which happen to be most
amenable to the introduction of the new technology.
Most strikingly (!),if the technology is controlled by a
few industrialists, or vulnerable to action by a small
group of workers, then their distributional gains may
diminish the advantages to society as a whole. But,
more generally, the resources for investment in new
equipment and retraining of displaced workers will
require mobilisation on a scale which will disrupt
markets because, as value is determined at the point
of production for this theory, the response of prices to
dramatic changes in production processes will also be
dramatic.
But if one concludes that change cannot be achieved
by anonymous market forces without risking high
unemployment, due to a lack of belief in subjective
preferences as the stabilising force of consumer
demand, and that change is also vulnerable to distor-
tion in the interests of small groups of people, then
how can society as a whole benefit from new techno-
logy? For contemporary cost of production theory,
Ricardo's pessimism has its antidote in the represen-
tative state and a disinterested bureaucracy rising
above particular interests for the benefit of the whole
society. The writings on inflation and growth by
Balogh [1970], Kuznets 1965J and Beckerman
[1971J demonstrate these principles in action.
Detailed state intervention is not only necessary if the
economy is to continue but is also possible because of
the stability and predictability of several crucial rela-
tionships at the level of the whole economy which are
unstable at the level of the individual. Thus alongside
and complementing the cost of production theory of
value, are the pluralist theory of politicswhich
analyses conditions for compromise and power brok-
ingand sociological theories of bureaucracy-
which analyse the conditions for and limitations of
effective action in large organisations.
Whilst the general principles of cost of production
theory do show continuity, in that they start from
production as given, analyse distribution as a prob-
lem and end with a rationale for state intervention,
the precise content of theory has changed with tech-
nology. For the cost of production theory this is
totally consistent, since economics is a social institu-
tion with its own vested interests, especially as prac-
tised in universities, and so will not only have to
change but will also possess the conservatism that
other institutions have when faced with change. This
conservatism has received a formal statement in the
concept of 'paradigms' put forward by Thomas Kuhn.
Broadly this concept draws attention to the tendency
for groups of intellectuals to become totally absorbed
in the logical puzzles of a particular theory. When
outside change occurs, then the intellectuals have to
be wrenched reluctantly back from metaphysical
speculation to the problems of the real world, and a
new theoretical formulation, or paradigm, may be
necessary. Change and adaptability are therefore
required and pragmatism is a virtue in that prompt
reform may avoid confrontation and avert collapse.
For instance, a theory suitable for an economy of
owner-managers will not necessarily apply to an
economy based on large joint-stock corporations.
The common theoretical ground from Ricardo to
Galbraith is explicable on the grounds that techno-
logy is a 'non metaphysical' starting assumption,
unlike utility in subjective preference theory and
exploitation in abstract labour theory, and that the
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basic categories of distribution (wage, profit and
rent) have remained largely unchanged.
The Abstract Labour Theory of Value
Ricardo's lack of confidence in the market system
coexisted historically with the development of 'social-
ism' as a set of ideas and political activities. Smith's
positive evaluation of capitalism was criticised on
moral grounds, due to the poor living conditions of
the mass of factory workers, and on political grounds
because increased repression seemed necessary to
maintain the system. It was the work of Karl Marx
which linked valuation in the market to this previous
rather utopian critique of capitalism by self-labelled
socialists. The rigorous aspect of Marx's thought was
to refuse to assume that any aspect of human activity
was to be treated as given, eg tastes and technology,
and yet still manage to say something about the
nature of valuation as society changed. For the ab-
stract labour theory of value it is thus assumed that
the structure of demand is determined by changing
social convention and that techniques of production
are changed as a response to changing social relation-
ships, not just as a result of evolving knowledge of
nature. As moral and political valuations also change
over time, valuation cannot be on the basis of saying
capitalism is invariably evil or violent but more that it
is out-dated historically.
When people combine to produce, they do so in
social relationships which are not simply dictated by
technical requirements but involve considerations of
power and status. The whole structure of production,
distribution, exchange and consumption reflects
these relationships. One such relationship is the
commodity relationship in which people relate to
each other through markets using money. This rela-
tionship has become dominant in a type of society
Marx called capitalist which historically appeared
when large numbers of people were no longer able to
produce without first selling their working ability to
someone else. In such a situation there is the possibil-
ity in the abstract that more work effort may be sold
by the workers than the effort embodied in the goods
that the workers require to provide that work effort
(the concept of 'exploitation'). In that gap between
what the worker requires and what the worker can
give lies the possibility of profit accruing to capitalists
for whom the workers must work in order to live.
What turns this possibility into reality is not the
avarice of capitalists but their own struggle for survi-
val. Profit appears as money, not as a collection of
physical goods, and employers must show adequate
profits if they are to survive. The valuation of
machines, buildings and stocks in money terms varies
with changes in social conditions, usually with a
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downward trend, as rivals bring in changes to reduce
the mount of effort required per unit of output (which
was over-simplified in Ricardian terms as a reduction
in amount of labour time required) thus forcing each
capitalist towards new innovation or bankruptcy.
Thus pressure on individual capitalists also comes
from commodity relationships and, in general, capi-
talism is subject to the tension that downward pres-
sures on profit rates exert. This point of view under-
lines the position of Arrighi [1978] and Bullock!
Yaffe [19751. Thus in the abstract labour theory of
value, the apparent paradoxthat in spite of vastly
increasing output there is increasing conflict in
capitalist societiesis resolved. Capitalism can never
rest on its achievements and is always in danger of
destroying itself, but the question remains whether
another social relationship develops within capital-
ismremember that central to the materialist rigour
of this theory of value is that nothing comes from
outside experience, whether it be a deus ex machina,
the seventh cavalry, or the Bolshevik Partywhich
can build on the inherited material affluence.
This question raises the crucial issues of the relation-
ship of the abstract labour theory of value to action,
and its self-justification as scientific knowledge. The
term 'dialectics' with connotations of inherent,
irresolvable, structural contradictions leading to basi-
cally unforeseeable change, is useful here. But at a
more immediate level, it was Marx who said that the
job of philosophers was to change the world, and
certainly self-avowed Marxists like Lenin and Mao
Tse-tung have answered that job description. The
underlying tendency or logic of capitalism, an ab-
stract reality in the mind, arising from the 'law' of
value which commodity relations produce, can only
be assessed by the effectiveness of political decisions
at the level of class struggle, a concrete reality in the
mind. The notion of praxis expresses this tension
between theory and practice and, for the abstract
labour theory of value, the praxis has been how to
mobilise those aspects of working class experience
which deny commodity relationshops (eg collective,
cooperative work) as the basis of working class poli-
tics. This project can be judged as successful in
explaining the development of capitalism through
imperialism, wars and depressions, and thus the ab-
stract labour theory of value has gained intellectual
credibility, but insofar as its adherents have failed to
produce a society which transcends commodity rela-
tionships, then abstract labour theory still has some
way to go to meet its own criterion of success.
To Learn One Theory of Economics is Quite Bad
Enough!
This is an understandable response to this article as a
basis for teaching economics. Some students cer-
tainly have wished we had made our minds up which
was 'best' and devoted our meagre talents to an
exposition of that theory alone. Our answer takes us
beyond the basic credibility criteria of rationalism,
realism and activism which we suggested above
towards a more comparative framework. The ideas of
the three schools have not developed in vacuo but in
relationship with each other. Writers have stimulated
and goaded each other into strengthening and
developing their theories. The ferocious energy
which has been put into debates that seem esoteric to
the non-economist can be understood in this light.
Each theory can be seen as having a set of core
propositions to defend against criticism, and barriers
are erected against attacks which also become areas
of theoretical development. The struggle to advance,
and stop retreats becoming routs, forms the theories,
and as time goes on the core propositions of each
theory are more likely to be revealed. Thus to under-
stand one theory completely requires some know-
ledge of the others.
As, in general, core propositions are those least
amenable to empirical investigation, then reference
to observations are unlikely to help rank the theories.
Even if in principle a test can be designed, there are
many ways in which test results can be queried. For
instance, have the assumptions of the theory been
met, and are the observations accurate and statisti-
cally adequate? The limits of empiricism are fre-
quently discussed by social scientists, but the discus-
sions too often are couched in terms of 'thinkers who
don't observe' versus 'observers who don't think'. Of
course, this dichotomy is ridiculous and may conceal
the real issue that some propositions do not lend
themselves to easy experimental testing.
In similar vein, it is understandable that, as divisions
in the subject become more obvious, the belief
should gain support that if only the 'facts' could be
examined in a disinterested way, then a new econom-
ics would emerge. Whilst such a response can be
sympathised with, there is the remaining problem
that gathering 'facts' requires some preconceptions of
where to look and what to look for. This preliminary
organisation is, in effect, primitive theory and it
seems likely that such a primitive theory will imply a
more sophisticated theory that will closely resemble
one of the theories already available.
Observation and measurement do not offer, there-
fore, an obvious solution to the question of choosing
between theories. Also the central cores of proposi-
tions are unlikely to fail a test of logic. Any effective
attack on these propositions has thus to be on the
essential nature of the propositions as foundations of
scientific knowledge. Unfortunately the term 'sci-
ence' is as elusive as the term 'economics'. Amid a
philosophical jungle of epistemological bases,
ontological statuses, and teleological determinisms, a
student may feel nostalgic for the friendly forest of
economics. Our investigations of the theory of know-
ledge as currently practised have convinced us that it
offers little help in choosing between the three
theories of value; Such philosophy provides a lan-
guage for description which is precise, but stops short
of giving clear criteria for naming a sub-set of know-
ledge as 'scientific' beyond the rationalism, realism
and activism criteria which all three theories of value
meet.
But what of our own claim at least to see the divisions,
even if we stop short of immediately selecting one as
superior. This apparent arrogance may well owe
something to the personalities of the authors but has
other explanations which situate this approach in a
wider context. We have already suggested above
that, as time has passed, the conflict between the
theories was likely to reveal the deeper disagree-
ments between economists. In addition, there is a
general perception that economic problems in the
UK have been exceptionally acute in the 1970s,
compared with other economies. Also, in general,
world politics have become noticeably more ideolog-
ical in content in the last few years compared to the
proclaimed pragmatic reformism and convergence
theories of the 1960s. Thus in time and location the
authors and their students stand in a peculiarly
privileged position. The analysis in this article is
partly a contribution to current debates, in that it tries
to present each major case in its purest and strongest
form. In order to fulfil this objective completely,
however, it is important to use this framework to face
the whole range of policy issues which are on the
agenda of world politics at this time, and show the
coherence of various positions by reference back to
the general points of principle. Thus we view the
principles of economics, as laid out here, as necessary
but insufficient for a full development studies course.
The course as we have taught it lasted for about
one third of the students' first year and, although we
would naturally have liked more time to develop the
ideas, we consider this to be adequate, provided the
principles are explicitly built into later courses of a
more problem-oriented type.
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